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SIXTH AMENDMENT-WAIVER OF THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
COUNSEL AT POST-INDICTMENT
INTERROGATION
Patterson v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Patterson v. Illinois,' the United States Supreme Court held
that the petitioner had consummated an effective waiver of his sixth
amendment2 right to have counsel present during post-indictment
interrogation when that waiver was executed prior to making volun-
tary,3 inculpatory statements at interviews initiated by law enforce-
ment officials, in which petitioner neither had counsel nor had
requested counsel. 4 In affirming the decision of the Illinois
Supreme Court,5 the Patterson majority reached a tripartite decision.
Firstly, the Court restated its decision in Michigan v. Jackson,6
which held that, if a defendant asserts his or her right to be assisted
by counsel, authorities are immediately barred from further post-
indictment interrogation, unless the defendant subsequently "call[s]
for such a meeting."7 The Patterson Court then held that where a
defendant elects not to exercise his or her sixth amendment right to
counsel, the defendant's uncounseled, inculpatory statements are
valid if the state can prove the existence of a "knowing and intelli-
gent" waiver.
8
1 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988).
2 The right to counsel clause of the sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2394 n.4 ("[W]e. .. require that any such waiver must be
voluntary. Petitioner contested the voluntariness of his confession in trial and in the
intermediate appellate courts, which rejected petitioner's claim that his confession was
coerced. Petitioner ... does not press this argument here. Thus, the voluntariness of
petitioner's confessions is not before us.").
4 Id. at 2394 ("Petitioner... at no time sought to have counsel present.").
5 People v. Thomas, 116 Ill. 2d 290, 507 N.E.2d 843 (1987), aff'd sub nom. Patterson v.
Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988).
6 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
7 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2394;Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636.
8 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2394.
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Secondly, the Patterson Court defined a "knowing and intelli-
gent" waiver when it held that:
[a]s a general matter, . . an accused who is admonished with the warn-
ings prescribed by this Court in Miranda v. Arizona,9 ... has been suffi-
ciently apprised of the nature of his sixth amendment rights, and of
the consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his waiver on
this basis will be considered a knowing and intelligent one.10
In short, the Court held that properly administered Miranda warn-
ings are sufficient to support a sixth amendment waiver of an ac-
cused's right to counsel.
In its five to four decision, the majority noted that its holding
was narrowly limited to waivers of counsel in post-indictment question-
ing only,' and specifically, in those situations in which an accused 12
has been informed of his indictment.'3 The Court also conceded that
Miranda compliance would not suffice in all cases of a sixth amend-
ment challenge to the conduct of post-indictment interrogation.' 4
For instance, when law enforcement officials fail to tell the accused
that his attorney is attempting to contact him, attachment of the ac-
cused's sixth amendment right to counsel would probably rebut an
executed waiver.' 5
Thirdly, the Court held that police-initiated questioning can oc-
9 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda Court held that "[p]rior to any questioning [a]
person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed." Id. at 444.
10 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2396-97 (footnote omitted).
'' Id. at 2395 n.5.
12 In this Note, the term "accused" will refer to a person who is protected by the
sixth amendment right to counsel, which assumes that adversarial proceedings have be-
gun. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324-25 (1959)(Douglas, J., concur-
ring)(distinguishing the appellations, "accused" and "suspect"). The word "suspect,"
on the other hand, will define a person whose right to counsel falls under the fifth
amendment protection provided by Miranda.
13 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2396-97 n.8 ("[W]e do not address the question of whether
or not an accused must be told that he has been indicted before a post-indictment Sixth
Amendment waiver will be valid. Nor do we even pass on the desirability of so inform-
ing the accused-a matter that [could] be reasonably debated.").
14 Id. at 2393 n.3.
15 Id. In the pre-indictment setting of Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), police
followed Miranda procedures in obtaining the suspect's written waivers of his fifth
amendment rights prior to securing his confession. Id. at 415. The Moran Court held
that the Miranda waiver would stand even though the police had not only failed to in-
form the suspect that his attorney had called to state her intention of representing him
during questioning, but had also deceived counsel as to when the suspect would be
interrogated. Id. at 432. The holding of the Patterson Court intimates that this waiver
would not be valid once the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel attaches be-
cause it is at this point that the attorney-client relationship is protected from any inter-
ference by law enforcement officials. Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2397 n.9.
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cur after the sixth amendment right to counsel has attached. 16 In
doing so, the majority rejected Patterson's argument that the attach-
ment of the sixth amendment right to counsel should be equated to
an invocation of the fifth amendment right to counsel.' 7
This Note examines the Patterson opinions and concludes that in
its effort to define when post-indictment interrogation may take
place without the assistance of counsel, the Court has reached a nar-
row holding which 1) erodes the sixth amendment right to counsel
of indicted persons which safeguards the accused from the powers
of the state's prosecutor once the adversary process has begun; 2)
drastically understates the benefits of counsel during post-indict-
ment interrogation to the accused; and 3) consequently, finds an
"intelligent" waiver in circumstances in which the accused cannot
be sufficiently apprised of the consequences of abandoning his
right. This Note reasons that the fifth amendment formula for
waiver, applied by Patterson to the sixth amendment context, is less
desirable than the dissent's alternative, which is to allow post-indict-
ment interrogation only when the defendant's counsel has either
been notified or is present, or when the state has secured permis-
sion from the Court. This Note concludes that the constitutional
principles and procedural waiver requirements forwarded by the
holding of Patterson v. Illinois are contradictory to our adversary sys-
tem ofjustice and should be reversed.
Furthermore, this Note concludes that the Court should have
adopted the additional procedural requirement of informing the ac-
cused of his indictment before a valid waiver can be executed.
II. FACTS
In the early morning of August 21, 1983, seventeen-year-old
Tyrone Patterson attended a party. The party roster included nine
members of the Vice Lords street gang, with whom Patterson was
affiliated, and thirty to forty members of a rival gang, the Black
Mobsters. 18
During the party, Patterson saw a fight break out between a
guest and members of the Vice Lords. He attempted to verbally
16 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2394.
17 Id. Patterson's claim here rested on the holding of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981). The Edwards Court held that if a pre-indictment suspect, who is being ques-
tioned, invokes his fifth ammendment right to have counsel present, he cannot thereaf-
ter be interrogated again unless he initiates the meeting. Id. at 484.
18 Joint Appendix at 19, People v. Thomas, 116 Ill. 2d 290, 507 N.E.2d 843




intervene, but failed when the guest engaged him in fisticuffs. 19 Co-
inciding with Patterson's rhubarb, another fight broke out between
the Vice Lords and the Black Mobsters. At this point, Patterson and
his friends-Juan McCune, David Thomas, and Carl Harmon; all
members of the Vice Lords-ran away from the party. Two Black
Mobsters chased them. 20
Patterson and his friends ran to a place called the 1623 Club
where they briefly confronted their two pursuers. 2' They then fled
from this fight when four carloads of Black Mobsters approached.
22
After moving from one location to another, the four ended up at
Thomas' home.23
While standing in front of the Thomas house, a former member
of the Black Mobsters, James Jackson, drove up and called out,
"What do you want?" Carl Harmon retorted, "What do you mean
what do we want?" 24 He then walked over to the car, got in, re-
moved the ignition key and began striking Jackson. Harmon drag-
ged Jackson from the automobile and continued to severely beat
him.25 At one point, Jackson reached out and struck Patterson who
retaliated several times with his fists and with the victim's own shoe,
which had previously flown off.26  The four then placed Jackson
back into the car and drove him to a small park at the end of a
nearby street. 27 Once there, Harmon threw the former Black Mob-
ster from the automobile, repeatedly struck him, and then drowned
him in a mud puddle. The four scattered from the scene, leaving
the dead body face down in the water. The police discovered Jack-
son in this position later that morning. 28
McCune, Thomas, and Patterson were separately arrested that
afternoon on warrants obtained by police for charges stemming
from the fight at the 1623 Club. McCune was taken into custody
first.29 During questioning, McCune waived his Miranda rights and
confessed to his involvement in both the gang fights and theJackson
murder; his statement also implicated Patterson, Thomas, and
19 Id.
20 Id. at 44.
21 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2392; Joint Appendix at 20.
22 Joint Appendix at 21.
23 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2392.
24 Joint Appendix at 22.
25 Id.
26 Id.






Patterson was subsequently arrested a few hours later and was
read his rights as required under Miranda v. Arizona.3' Patterson
stated that he understood his rights and volunteered a statement
regarding the fight at the 1623 Club. Patterson asserted, however,
that he did not know anything about Jackson's murder.3 2 Patterson
remained in police custody through the next day, while the State
Attorney's office and police completed their investigation. 3
On the morning of August 23, Patterson and the other suspects
were removed from detention in the holding cells and brought to
the detective bureau. Patterson was separated from the others and
was informed by the arresting officer, Michael Gresham, that he had
been indicted for the offenses of murder and armed violence.34 Pat-
terson then asked about the number of other indictments that had
been handed down. Upon learning that only three of the four had
been indicted, excluding Carl Harmon, Patterson asked: "[W]hy
wasn't he indicted, he did everything." 35 He additionally stated that
a female witness existed who could verify his version of the crime
because Harmon had confessed to her.3
6
Officer Gresham immediately stopped the conversation and
readvised Patterson of his Miranda rights by giving him a printed
waiver form containing the Miranda warnings.3 7 This was the first
and only waiver form Patterson was given.38 The waiver form was
not reproduced in the Trial Record or the Joint Appendix; however,
Patterson conceded that it apprised him of his Miranda rights.3 9
Officer Gresham read the Miranda waiver aloud to Patterson.
Patterson read the form to himself in the presence of Gresham, ini-
tialed each warning individually in the designated boxes, and signed
his name at the bottom. Gresham and his partner then co-signed
30 Id.
31 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For a discussion of Miranda, see supra note 9.
32 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2392.
33 Id.
34 Id. See ahoJoint Appendix at 6. Officer Gresham testified that the defendants were
brought up from the lock-up together, but were informed of their indictments sepa-
rately. Id. at 12.
35 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2392.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Joint Appendix at 9.
39 Apparently the warnings read to Patterson told him that he had the right to remain
silent; that anything he might say could be used against him; that he had the right to
have an attorney present during interrogation; and that, as an indigent, the state would




the form.40 After this procedure Gresham told Patterson to con-
tinue telling him what he had started to say.4 1 Patterson responded
by issuing a lengthy account of the crime detailing his involvement
as well as the role of each participant in the murder of Jackson.
42
Later that day, Officer Gresham led Patterson to a private room
in which Patterson confessed involvement in the murder for a sec-
ond time during an interview with Assistant State's Attorney George
Smith.43 At the beginning of the interview, Smith introduced him-
self by name and presented Patterson with the previously executed
Miranda waiver form bearing Patterson's initials and signature.
44
After showing Patterson the form, Smith inquired as to whether Pat-
terson had read the waiver, had understood the rights enumerated
on the form, had initialed each warning, and had signed the docu-
ment. Patterson answered affirmatively. 45 Smith then read the com-
plete form aloud and again questioned Patterson if he understood
the rights just explained. Patterson indicated that he did, at which
point Smith signed the waiver form.
46
Following this discourse Smith reported to Patterson that he
was an assistant State's Attorney working in the felony review unit.
In addition, Smith stated that he was not his lawyer, but rather an
attorney cooperating with police in the Jackson murder investiga-
tion.47 Patterson proclaimed that he understood Smith's position
and proceeded to give another inculpatory statement concerning
the crime. According to Smith's testimony at trial, Patterson noted
that the statement was delivered of his own free will, with no threats
or promises being made to him, and that he was providing the state-
ment voluntarily because it was the truth.
48
40 Id. at 2392.
41 Joint Appendix at 8.
42 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2393. Patterson presented a different factual story at trial
concerning the following: what Officer Gresham said when informing him of his indict-
ment; when he was read his Miranda rights; and when he signed the waiver form. At the
trial court hearing on the motion to suppress
Patterson denied receiving any warnings about his right to counsel before he gave
his statement. He testified that on August 23, Gresham told him that he had been
indicted and that Harmon would testify. Gresham also indicated that if Patterson
told him what he knew, it would go better for him. [Patterson also alleged that] [h]e
did not sign the Miranda rights waiver form until after he gave his statement.
Joint Appendix at 29.
43 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2393.
44 Id. at 2393.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Joint Appendix at 18.
48 Id. The facts of what took place between Smith and Patterson are based solely on
Smith's testimony because the interview was not recorded manually or mechanically.
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Prior to trial, Patterson moved to supress his statements to po-
lice claiming, in part, that they were taken in violation of certain
constitutionally guaranteed rights. 49 The trial court denied Patter-
son's motions and the statements were used against him. On this
evidence, the jury found Patterson guilty of murder and sentenced
him to twenty-four years in prison.50
At the appellate levels, 51 Patterson argued that the trial court
erred in admitting Patterson's uncounseled post-indictment state-
ments to Officer Gresham and Smith because Patterson had not ef-
fected a waiver which sufficiently satisfied the "knowing and
intelligent" minimum standard required by the United States
Supreme Court.
52
The United States Supreme Court has defined a waiver of the
sixth amendment right to counsel as being valid only if it evidences
"an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege."15 3 According to Moran v. Burbine,54 this means that the
accused must possess "'a full awareness [of] both the nature of the
right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it.' "55
Patterson contended that neither the admonitions required by
Miranda under the fifth amendment nor his knowledge of the fact
that he had been indicted for Jackson's murder afforded him suffi-
cient information to evince a knowing and intelligent waiver.56 The
crux of Patterson's proposition was that the State should have to
satisfy a higher burden to establish a knowing and intelligent waiver
of the sixth amendment right to counsel than is necessary to estab-
lish a waiver of the right to counsel guaranteed in Miranda.
57
Although the Illinois Supreme Court found that Patterson's
sixth amendment right to counsel had definitely attached at the time
he gave his statements to law enforcement officials, that court re-
jected Patterson's argument. 58 The court premised its holding on a
Furthermore, Smith's testimony could not be confirmed by Patterson because he did not
testify at trial. Id. at 28.
49 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2393.,
50 Id.
51 People v. Patterson, 140 Ill. App. 3d 421, 488 N.E.2d 1283 (1986), aff'd sub nom.
People v. Thomas, 116 Il1. 2d 290, 507 N.E.2d 843 (1987).
52 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2393.
53 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
54 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
55 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2395 (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 421).





prior Illinois Supreme Court decision, People v. Owens,59 which had
held that "Miranda warnings were sufficient to make a defendant
aware of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during post-indict-
ment questioning."
60
In the present case, the Illinois Supreme Court found that Pat-
terson understood his constitutional rights prior to post-indictment
interrogation because he was advised of his Miranda rights and he
indicated that he understood them.61 The court further found that
Patterson was aware of the gravity of his situation because he knew
that he had been indicted on the murder charge before he gave his
statements to Gresham and Smith.62 Therefore, the Illinois
Supreme Court concluded that Patterson "knowingly and intelli-
gently waived his sixth amendment right to counsel."
63
The United States Supreme Court granted a petition for certio-
rari,64 to decide the waiver issue which the lower courts had left un-
resolved and which the Court had not addressed in its previous
decisions.
65
III. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
In Patterson v. Illinois,66 the United States Supreme Court upheld
the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, holding that Patterson
had effectively waived his right to have counsel present at his post-
indictment interrogations.67 By rejecting Patterson's claim, which
challenged the elicited, inculpatory admissions as sixth amendment
violative, the Court sanctioned the admission of those statements as
evidence to be used against him at his trial. 68 In writing for the ma-
59 102 111. 2d 88, 464 N.E.2d 261 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 963 (1984).
60 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2393; Owens, 102 Ill. 2d at 102-03, 464 N.E.2d at 267. The
defendant's position in Owens was similar to Patterson's in that the defendant was ap-
prised of his Miranda rights before questioning; he stated that he understood these
rights; and he signed a form waiving them. Thomas, 116 Ill. 2d at 299-300, 507 N.E.2d at
846-47. The defendant in Owens was also judged to have known the severity of the situa-
tion facing him since he knew he was being held for questioning in connection with a
murder. Id.
61 Thomas, 116 Ill. 2d at 299-300, 507 N.E.2d at 847.
62 Id.
63 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2393.
64 108 S. Ct. 227 (1987).
65 Patterson, 108 U.S. at 2393.
66 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988).
67 Id. at 2395.
68 Id. at 2399.
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jority,69 Justice White analogized Patterson's post-indictment posi-
tion to that of a pre-indicted suspect, who has similarly declined
counseled representation, and equated the function of counsel at
post-indictment interrogation to an attorney's role at pre-indict-
ment questioning.70 The majority reasoned that the similarity of the
two stages of interrogation supports the argument that, if Miranda
warnings are adequate to evince a "knowing and intelligent" waiver
in a fifth amendment setting, then they should be equally applicable
to a sixth amendment context. 7'
Justice White began his opinion for the Court by asserting that
the sixth amendment right to have counsel present at post-indict-
ment interviews had undoubtedly attached by the time Patterson
made his first statement to Officer Gresham.72 The Supreme Court
precedents, 73 the Court cited in support of this conclusion, made it
clear to Justice White that:
[w]hatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth
and Fourteenth amendments means at least that a person is entitled to
the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have
been initiated against him-"whether by way offormal charge, prelimi-
nary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." 74
The majority then pointed out that, although Patterson's sixth
69 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2391-99. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court
in which ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined.
70 Id. at 2391, 2397-99.
71 Id. at 2397-99.
72 Id. at 2393.
73 Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629-30 (1986)(post-arraignment confessions
suppressed, based on sixth amendment right to counsel, where accused requested ap-
pointment of counsel, but police denied request and extracted confessions during inter-
rogation); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-401 (1977) (post-arraignment
confessions suppressed as sixth amendment violative where statements deliberately elic-
ited by officer during custodial transportation of accused after counsel was retained);
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-07 (1964)(incriminating statements in viola-
tion of sixth amendment where confession deliberately elicited in bugged car of co-de-
fendant informant in absence of attorney after sixth amendment right to counsel
exercised by accused).
74 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689
(1972) (emphasis added). Accord Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2393. See also Michigan v. Jack-
son, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), in which the Court held that:
[t]he question is not whether [the accused] had a right to counsel at their post-
arraignment, custodial interrogations. The existence of that right is clear. It has
two sources. The Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination
provides the right to counsel at custodial interrogations. Edwards [v. Arizona], 451
U.S. [477,] 482 [1981]; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966). The Sixth
Amendment guarantee of the assistance of counsel also provides the right to coun-
sel at postarraignment interrogations. The arraignment signals "the initiation of
adversary judicial proceedings" and thus attachment of the Sixth Amendment, U.S.
v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187, 188 (1984); thereafter, government efforts to elicit
information from the accused, including interrogation, represent "critical stages" at
which the Sixth Amendment applies. Maine v. Moulton, 474-U.S. 159 (1985); U.S.
1988] 803
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amendment right to counsel had indeed attached, he did not exer-
cise it.75 In light of Patterson's failure to assert his sixth amendment
rights, the majority evaluated the following issues: whether the law
enforcement officials were barred from initiating a meeting with Pat-
terson by virtue of the attachment of his sixth amendment rights,
and, if not, whether Patterson validly waived his right to counsel at
the post-indictment interrogations. 7
6
Addressing the first issue, the majority dismissed Patterson's
claim that, since his sixth amendment right had previously come
into existence, the police should have been barred from questioning
him.77 Justice White said that Patterson's reasoning was faulty be-
cause interrogation restrictions, both in a fifth and sixth amendment
context, arise only when the accused asserts his right to counsel. 78
This prerequisite, he concluded, was not met in Patterson's case. 79
The majority recognized that if Patterson had "indicated he
wanted the assistance of counsel, the authorities' interview with him
would have been stopped, and further questioning would have been
forbidden. 80 However, since Patterson gave no such indication, 8'
the majority rejected his argument, and further supported its con-
clusion by analogizing Patterson to a pre-indictment interrogatee
who similarly has an available right to counsel under the fifth
amendment, but does not assert that right.
8 2
In denying Patterson's claim, the Court said that Patterson's re-
liance on Edwards v. Arizona83 was erroneous.8 4 In Edwards, said the
v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
Jackson, 475 U.S. at 629-30.
75 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2394. The Court noted that, had Patterson asserted his
right to have counsel represent him by retaining counsel or accepting a lawyer by ap-
pointment, "a distinct set of constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of
the attorney-client privilege [would have taken] effect," and changed the outcome of the
case. Id. at 2393 n.3.
76 Id. at 2394-97.
77 Id. at 2394.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. This was the holding in both Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636, and Edwards, 451 U.S. at
484-85. Edwards first reached this holding in a fifth amendment situation. Jackson later
"applied Edwards to the Sixth Amendment context." Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2394.
81 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2394.
82 Id.
83 451 U.S. 477 (1981). In Edwards, police arrested Edwards, properly told him of his
Miranda rights, questioned him and provided him with the phone number of a county
attorney. Id. at 478-79. Edwards telephoned the attorney, but received no answer. At
that point, he stated "I want an attorney before I make a deal." Id. at 479. The ques-
tioning was ended and Edwards was returned to his cell. The next morning, state offi-
cials confronted Edwards at the jail and told him that he had to speak with them.
[Vol. 79804
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majority, the Supreme Court rejected the validity of a fifth amend-
ment waiver, holding that once a suspect has invoked his right to
counsel, a waiver cannot exist unless the suspect later intiates a
meeting with police. 5 Justice White distinguished Edwards from
Patterson's case86 by noting that the fifth amendment-violative ques-
tioning in Edwards hinged on the defendant's previously expressed
desire to deal with law enforcement officials only through counsel;
87
a factor missing from Patterson's circumstances.88
Thus, even though indictment signals the attachment of an ac-
cused's sixth amendment right to have counsel present at post-in-
dictment interviews, if he or she at no time seeks to exercise that
right, law enforcement officials will not be barred from intiating a
meeting with the accused.8 9
Justice White then added that the theory behind Edwards and its
progeny was not formulated in order to restrict an accused from
choosing to confront state officials with or without counsel, but
rather to preserve "the integrity of an accused's right to communicate
with police only through counsel." 90 Therefore, if Patterson "know-
ingly and intelligently" chose to face police without counsel, the major-
ity said it could "see no reason why the uncounseled statements he
then [made] must be excluded at his trial."9 1
The majority then considered Patterson's second claim that his
sixth amendment rights were violated because he did not "know-
ingly and intelligently" waive his right to have counsel present at the
post-indictment questioning.
92
Justice White opened this portion of the opinion of the Court
by briefly describing what constitutes a valid waiver of the sixth
Edwards was willing to talk and subsequently implicated himself. Id. The Supreme
Court overturned Edwards' conviction on the basis that the police's actions violated his
fifth amendment right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation. Id. at
481-87. Patterson claimed that, like Edwards, he did not initiate the questioning. Joint
Appendix at 29, Patterson v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988)(No. 86-7059). Further-
more, Patterson argued that his non-initiation, when coupled with, inter alia, the clear
attachment of his sixth amendment right to counsel, should induce the Court, in the
spirit of Edwards, to reverse his conviction and bar police from initiating communication
with an accused after the adversarial criminal process has started. Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at
2394.
84 Id.
85 Id. (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85).






92 Id. at 2394-97.
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amendment right to counsel.93 Having reviewed the parameters set
by Supreme Court precedents, 94 the majority surmised that:
the key inquiry in a case such as this one must be: Was the accused,
who waived his sixth amendment rights during post-indictment ques-
tioning, made sufficiently aware of his right to have counsel present
during the questioning, and of the possible consequences of a decision
to forgo the aid of counsel?95
Answering this "key inquiry" affirmatively, Justice White concluded
that the Miranda warnings, given to Patterson prior to his state-
ments, served the function of both making him sufficiently aware of
his sixth amendment right to counsel and alerting him to the possi-
ble consequences of waiving this right.
96
With respect to the "knowing" half of the standard, Patterson
claimed that, because the Miranda warnings were designed by the
Court to specifically inform a suspect of his fifth amendment right to
counsel, they were insufficient to let him know of his sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. The majority rejected this argument on the
grounds that the wording of the Miranda warnings, given to Patter-
son by state officials, comprised the "sum and substance" of his
sixth amendment rights.
97
In a fifth amendment context, the Court said, Miranda requires
that the suspect be told that he has a right to remain silent and a
right to the presence of an attorney, retained or appointed. 98 The
majority doubted that any augmentation of the language required
by Miranda would have better or more completely communicated
the existence of the accused's sixth amendment right to counsel in
93 Id. at 2395.
94 Id. at 2393. In Patterson, the majority relied on Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938), a sixth amendment waiver case, in which the Court held that waivers of counsel
must not only be voluntary, but also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege; a matter which depends in each case
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the back-
ground, experience and conduct of the defendant. Id. at 467-68. See also Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)(In upholding a conviction of
defendant who conducted trial pro se, the Court held that accused may "waive his Con-
stitutional right to assistance of counsel if he knows what he is doing and his choice is
made with eyes open.").
At the time Patterson went to trial, procedural requirements for waiver of the sixth
amendment right to counsel were much less defined than those pertaining to the fifth
amendment waiver, which are comparatively uniform and clear. See infra notes 200-219
and accompanying text for historical commentary.
95 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2395. See infra notes 200-219 and accompanying text for
historical and definition commentary.
96 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2395.
97 Id.
98 Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471).
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this case. 99 Thus, the Court held that Patterson's receipt of his fifth
amendment warnings satisfied the "knowing" portion of the waiver
inquiry in a sixth amendment setting.100
Turning to the "intelligent" component of the waiver standard,
the majority again focused on the proffered Miranda warnings.
More specifically, the Court concentrated on that segment of the
warnings which dictate that an accused be told that, if he abandons
his rights, whatever he says "can be used against him in a court of
law."''1 1 Justice White held that this warning made Patterson suffi-
ciently aware of the possible consequences of forsaking his sixth
amendment right to an attorney. 10 2 The majority reasoned that the
warning accomplishes this by apprising the accused of "the ultimate
adverse consequence [he could suffer] by virtue of his choice to make
uncounseled admissions to the authorities" 103 -that is, the use of
his own words against him in subsequent criminal proceedings.
The Court buttressed its conclusion, that the current language
in Miranda would suffice, by noting that Patterson's lawyer failed to
articulate any modifying wordage which would have meaningfully
increased Patterson's awareness of the consequences he faced by
disposing of counsel.' 0 4 The majority further pointed out that the
accused's recognition of these consequences need not be a full and
complete one. 105 The Court applied the constitutional minimum set
out in Oregon v. Elstad,10 6 which held that an extensive "appreciation
of all of the consequences flowing from the waiver"10 7 is not neces-
99 Id. at 2395.
100 Id. at 2397.
101 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468, 479.
102 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2395.
'o3 Id. (emphasis added).
104 Id. at 2396 n.7.
105 Id. at 2396-97.
106 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
107 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2396 (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316-17). In the fifth
amendment setting of Elstad, the suspect was taken into custody at his home, was ques-
tioned by the arresting officers without the benefit of Miranda warnings, and subse-
quently gave a short incriminating statement. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300. He was
interrogated again at the police station, after being read his Miranda rights, and re-
sponded with a more detailed statement with greater inculpatory facts. Id. at 300-01.
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the second statement because the careful and
thorough administration of the Miranda warnings served to inform the suspect of his
rights prior to elicitation. Id. at 310-11.
The suspect argued that his waiver, made prior to the second statement, should be
overruled. He reasoned that the waiver was less than fully informed because he had not
been told that his first statement could not be used against him due to the Miranda
violation. Id. at 316. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that "[t]his
Court has never embraced the theory that the defendant's ignorance of the full conse-
quences of his decisions vitiates their voluntariness." Id. The Court reasoned that the
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sary for the State to meet its burden of proof.'0 8 Thus, the Court
held that Patterson's receipt of his fifth amendment warnings also
satisfied the "intelligent" portion of the waiver inquiry in a sixth
amendment context.1
0 9
Patterson had argued that there existed post-waiver conse-
quences, which only his lawyer could properly inform him about. 1 10
Commenting on the scope of information that an accused should
receive prior to waiving his sixth amendment right to counsel, Pat-
terson suggested that any warning must inform the accused of two
basic factors: the benefits he could obtain by having the aid of coun-
sel while making statements to state officials; and "the gravity of
[his] situation."'1 1 The essence of Patterson's claim was that the
fifth amendment Miranda warnings had failed in these respects, and
therefore, his waiver was invalid.
Speaking first to the latter of these requirements, Justice White
dispelled the necessity of this information in two ways. First, the
majority reasoned that Patterson had surely been notified of the
gravity of his situation when he learned that he had been indicted
for the charge of murder.' 12 Second, the Court emphasized that let-
ting an accused know of his indictment status has not been deter-
mined to be a requirement of the waiver inquiry and must be further
examined. 1 3 However, since this issue was mooted by the fact that
Patterson had been so informed, the Court explicitly refrained from
deciding "the question of whether or not an accused must be told
that he has been indicted before a post-indictment Sixth Amend-
ment waiver will be valid." ' 1 4 Nor would the Court "even pass on
the desirability of so informing the accused-a matter that [could]
reasonably be debated."' 1 5
In considering the former requirement suggested by Patterson
that he be apprised of the beneficial protection counsel could pro-
vide during post-indictment questioning, the Court acknowledged
that this was indeed a consequence of the waiver which must be
police should not be expected to give the suspect legal advice as to the inadmissibility of
his earlier statement because the suspect has a right to an attorney, whose job includes
explaining the admissible status of unwarned statements. Id.
108 Id.
109 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2397.
110 Id. at 2396.
111 Id.
112 Id.





communicated, 116 but said that it had been accounted for by the lan-
guage of Miranda.117 Justice White stated that since fifth amend-
ment admonitions made Patterson aware that his statements could
be used against him in court, the warnings also sufficed to let Patter-
son know what benefits could accrue from having an attorney pres-
ent at such statements. 1 8
The Court's analysis here was predicated on the majority's per-
ception that counsel's role during post-indictment interrogations is
relatively simple and limited when compared with counsel's needed
procedural expertise at later stages of criminal proceedings.' 19 The
Court reasoned that:
[a]t trial, an accused needs an attorney to perform several varied func-
tions-some of which are entirely beyond even the most intelligent
layman. Yet during postindictment questioning, a lawyer's role is
rather unidimensional: largely limited to advising his client as to what
questions to answer and which ones to decline to answer.12
0
In other words, if Patterson knew that, following an executed
waiver, any inculpatory statements made could be admitted as evi-
dence against him, then he must have likewise known that the sole
benefit of having counsel present-keeping him from making such
statements-would also be waived. 121
In his brief, Patterson rebutted the argument that Miranda
warnings, which were designed to admonish a suspect of his fifth
amendment right to counsel in a custodial setting, should be suffi-
cient to waive the right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth amend-
ment, which attaches after the adversarial process has begun.
122
Patterson's claim rested on the analysis that the difference in poli-
cies giving rise to these two distinct rights causes the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel to be of a superior nature and, consequently,
more difficult to waive than the fifth amendment guarantee. 123 The
Court held that while there is a difference between fifth amendment
and sixth amendment rights to counsel, as well as different policies
behind such constitutional guarantees, the sixth amendment right to
116 Id. at 2395-96. The Court never explicitly stated this point, but the Court's treat-





120 Id. at 2396-97 n.6.
121 Id.





counsel is not superior to the fifth amendment right.1 24
In supporting its conclusion on this point, the majority rejected
Patterson's hierarchy-based analysis of the right to counsel and
opted for a more "pragmatic approach."'' 25 The Court defined this
"pragmatic approach" to the waiver question as one which "focuses
more on the lawyer's role during such questioning, rather than the
particular constitutional guarantee that gives rise to the right to
counsel at that proceeding."'
' 26
The Court then examined what purposes a lawyer serves and
what assistance he lends to a defendant during specific stages of the
criminal proceedings. 127 After reviewing precedents, 128 in which
the Court had decided the waiver question in a variety of stages in
the criminal process, the Court held that the waiver inquiry depends
on a "pragmatic assessment of the usefulness of counsel to the ac-
cused at the particular proceeding," during which he may have to
deal with legal problems or face his adversary, "and the dangers to
the accused of proceeding without counsel. An accused's waiver of
his right to counsel is 'knowing' when he is made aware of these
basic facts." 1
29
Applying its "pragmatic approach" to the present case, the
Court compared counsel's role during questioning of a suspect in a
fifth amendment context to the interrogation of an accused in a
sixth amendment setting. 130 The majority held that the usefulness
of counsel does not increase solely because the state has initiated
the adversary process; an attorney's role at interrogation is analo-
gously simple and limited in both the fifth and sixth amendment
contexts.' 3 1 Therefore, Justice White concluded:
124 Id. at 2397.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 2397-98.
127 Id. at 2398.
128 Id. The majority viewed the waiver inquiry as establishing a spectrum of situations
during the adversary process in which the validity of a waiver would be viewed in light of
the attorney's role in providing the accused with "'aid in coping with legal problems or
assistance in meeting his adversary.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300,
313-20 (1973). Compare Ash, 413 U.S. at 313-20 (no sixth amendment right to counsel
exists at a post-indictment photographic display identification procedure) with Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975)(sixth amendment right to counsel is critical at
trial and every effort must be employed by the Court to preserve it).
129 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2398.
130 Id. at 2398 n.12.
13 Id. The majority held that:
[t]he State's decision to take an additional step and commence formal adversarial
proceedings against the accused does not substantially increase the value of counsel
to the accused at questioning, or expand the limited purpose that an attorney serves
when the accused is questioned by authorities.... [W]e do not discern a substantial
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Because the role of counsel at questioning is relatively simple and lim-
ited, we see no problem in having a waiver procedure at that stage
which is likewise simple and limited. So long as the accused is made
aware of the "dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" dur-
ing postindictment questioning, by use of the Miranda warnings, his
waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel at such questioning is
"knowing and intelligent."' 32
Thus, the majority affirmed the Illinois Supreme Court's decision to




1. Justice Blackmun's Dissent
Justices Blackmun and Stevens dissented from the majority in
separate opinions. i3 4 Justice Blackmun concluded in his dissent 3 5
that "after formal adversary proceedings against a defendant have
been commenced, the Sixth Amendment mandates that the defend-
ant not be 'subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with
the police.' "136 Justice Blackmun also dissented from the majority's
holding that counsel's function at post-indictment interrogation is
equivalent to counsel's function at pre-indictment interrogation.13
7
He found this holding to be unconstitutional in light of Carnley v.
Cochran,138 and emphasized that "the Sixth Amendment does not
allow the prosecution to take undue advantage of any gap between
the commencement of the adversary process and the time at which
counsel is appointed for a defendant." 13
9
2. Justice Stevens' Dissent
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, con-
difference between the usefulness of a lawyer to a suspect during custodial interro-
gation, and his value to an accused at post-indictment questioning.
Id. (footnote omitted).
132 Id. at 2398-99.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 2399 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 2399-2405 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 2399 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
136 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 626
(1986))(citations omitted).
137 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2399 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
138 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962)(citations omitted). The Carnley
Court indicated that "when the Constitution grants protection against criminal proceed-
ings without the assistance of counsel, counsel must be furnished whether or not the
accused requested appointment of counsel." Id. at 513 (citations omitted).
139 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2399 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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cluded that Miranda warnings are inadequate to apprise an accused
of the information needed to execute a "knowing and intelligent"
waiver of his sixth amendment right to have counsel present during
post-indictment questioning. 40 Justice Stevens argued that the ad-
equacy or effectiveness of any legal advice given to the accused, Mi-
randa warnings included, is undermined by the adversarial position
of the state official who gives such advice. 14 1 According to Justice
Stevens, the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings makes all
subsequent, government advice, in uncounseled, state-initiated in-
terrogation, unethical and sixth amendment violative.
142
Justice Stevens supported his dissenting opinion by pointing to
Supreme Court precedents that critically emphasized the signifi-
cance of legal representation once adversary judicial proceedings
have begun.' 43 The majority opinion, he stated, "backs away from
the significance previously attributed to the initiation of formal pro-
ceedings" by reaching a decision "favorable to the interest in law
enforcement unfettered by process concerns."' 44 He further but-
tressed his argument with established procedural and social policy
reasons, under which the majority holding would be characterized
as promoting unethical and unfair trial practice.
145
Justice Stevens began his dissenting opinion by stating that the
majority's holding "condone[s] unethical forms of trial preparation
by prosecutors or their investigators." 1 46 Comparing the criminal
procedural guidelines forwarded by the majority to civil procedural
guidelines, Justice Stevens found the majority's permission of state-
initiated questioning of an accused to be lacking in ethical merit.147
Justice Stevens based his conclusion on Rule 4.2 of the 1984 ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. That rule reads: "'In repre-
senting a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of
the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented
by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of
the other lawyer or is authorized by the law to do so.'"148 In civil
litigation, said Justice Stevens, a breach of this rule would be a seri-
140 Id. at 2402 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 2399-2404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143 See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
689 (1972); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315, 324 (1959)(Douglas, J., concurring); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66-71 (1932).
144 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2402 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 2403-2404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 2399 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 2399 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at n.1 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1984)).
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ous infraction of professional ethics.' 49 Therefore, according to
Justice Stevens, Rule 4.2 and "notions of fairness that are at least as
demanding" dictate that the same ethical rules should apply in crim-
inal litigation; and, if they do not, "such a practice would not simply
constitute a serious ethical violation, but would rise to the level of
an impairment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."' 50
In defense of his contention, that the criminal procedural
guidelines authorized by the majority undermine the inviolate spirit
of the sixth amendment right to counsel, Justice Stevens cited Maine
v. Moulton.' 5 ' Re-establishing and defining the requisite protection
of an accused's sixth amendment right to counsel, Justice Stevens
relayed that the Moulton Court held:
Once the right to counsel has attached and been asserted, the State
must of course honor it. This means more than simply that the State
cannot prevent the accused from obtaining assistance of counsel. The
Sixth Amendment also imposes on the State an affirmative obligation
to respect and preserve the accused's choice to seek this assistance.
We have on several occasions been called upon to clarify the scope of
the State's obligation in this regard, and have made clear that, at the
very least, the prosecutor and police have an affirmative obligation not
to act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection
afforded by the right to counsel.'
52 '
Justice Stevens then summarily stated, "I think it is clear that an ex
parte communication between a prosecutor, or his or her agents, and
a represented defendant-regardless of whether the accused has re-
ceived Miranda warnings-can only be viewed as an attempt to 'cir-
cumven[t]' and 'dilut[e] the protection afforded by the right to
counsel.' "153 This statement and its supporting evidence not only
define the previous Supreme Court dedication to upholding the
constitutional principles involved, but also describe the precedenti-
ary trend on which Justice Stevens builds the remainder of his
dissent.
Because there clearly exist ethical principles, constitutional
guarantees, and Supreme Court precedents which mandate that the
sixth amendment right to counsel must be protected after the initia-
tion of adversarial proceedings, Justice Stevens asked, "at what
point.., does it become impermissible for the prosecutor, or his or
her agents, to conduct such private interviews 154 with the opposing
149 Id. at 2399-2400 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
150 Id. at 2400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
152 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2400 n.2 (Stevens,J., dissenting)(quoting Moulton, 474 U.S.
at 170-71 (footnote omitted)).
153 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171).
154 Justice Stevens defined "private interview" as meaning "an interview initiated by
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party?"' 155 He then answered that "the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel demands that a firm and unequivocal line be drawn at the
point at which adversary proceedings commence."' 156
Justice Stevens first challenged that part of the majority's argu-
ment which equated "the purported waiver in this case with... that
of an unindicted suspect."1 57 Citing Supreme Court precedents
that critically emphasized the importance of the initiation of adver-
sary proceedings to the waiver inquiry,158 Justice Stevens concluded
that "in reaching a decision ... favorable to the interest in law en-
forcement unfettered by process concerns, the Court backs away
from the significance previously attributed to the initiation of formal
proceedings." 159
Further relying on these precedents, the dissent noted that im-
portant distinctions exist between a pre-indictment interrogatee and
a post-indictment interrogatee.
The return of an indictment, or like instrument substantially alters the
relationship between the state and the accused. Only after a formal
accusation has "the government.., committed itself to prosecute, and
only then [have] the adverse positions of government and defendant
... solidified." . . . Moreover, the return of an indictment also presum-
ably signals the government's conclusion that it has sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case. As a result, any further interrogation
can only be designed to buttress the government's case; authorities are
no longer simply attempting "to solve a crime."'
160
"Given the significance of the initiation of formal proceedings and
the concomitant shift in the relationship between the state and the
accused," Justice Stevens concluded that it is "quite wrong to sug-
gest that Miranda warnings-or for that matter, any warnings offered
by an adverse party-provide a sufficient basis for permitting the
the prosecutor, or his or her agents, without notice to the defendant's lawyer and with-
out the permission of the court." Id. at 2400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 2401 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority disagreed with this conclusion.
Instead, the Court reasoned that, because counsel's function at post-indictment interro-
gation is equivalent to counsel's function at pre-indictment interrogation, the attach-
ment of the accused's sixth amendment right to counsel "does not distinguish him from
the pre-indictment interrogatee." 1d. at 2394. Furthermore, the majority held, if the
accused is in the same position as a pre-indictment interrogatee, then he can effectively
waive his right to counsel; and the Miranda warnings are a sufficient vehicle for this
waiver. Id. In disposing of the majority's argument here, Justice Stevens criticized each
level of the reasoning.
157 Id. at 2402 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158 See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
689 (1972); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315, 324 (1959)(Douglas,J., concurring); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66-71 (1932).
159 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2402 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(citations omitted).
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undoubtedly prejudicial-and, in my view, unfair-practice of per-
mitting trained law enforcement personnel and prosecuting attor-
neys to communicate with as-of-yet unrepresented criminal
defendants."'1
6
Justice Stevens next criticized that part of the majority's argu-
ment which held that Miranda warnings are sufficient to clearly ap-
prise the accused "of the consequences of abandoning [his sixth
amendment] rights,"1 62 or more specifically, "what a lawyer could
'do for him' during the post-indictment questioning."1 63 Justice
Stevens challenged this ruling in two ways. First, he gave several
examples of necessary and beneficial representation that the Mi-
randa warnings do not express-such as, "examin[ing] the indict-
ment for legal sufficiency before submitting [the accused] to
interrogation;" "skillfull[y] negotiating a plea bargain" and inform-
ing the accused "that such negotiations may be most fruitful if initi-
ated prior to any interrogation;" and the most rudimentary of all,
"explain[ing] to the accused the nature of the charges pending
against him."' 164 Second, Justice Stevens noted that the simple and
cursory language of Miranda cannot be universally applied because
of the individuality of each adversarial criminal proceeding.
"[U]nlike the Fifth Amendment context, the information that must
be imparted to the accused will vary from case to case as the facts,
legal issues, and parties differ."'
165
Thus, Justice Stevens rebutted the majority's contention that
Miranda warnings will suffice in this sixth amendment context.
166
However, in Justice Stevens' view, the failure of the Miranda warn-
ings to satisfy this burden does not obviate the need for at least
some case-particular advice from a judicial officer which lets the
161 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162 Id. at 2397.
163 Id. at 2395.
164 Id. at 2403 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 2403 n.4. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority either vacated this argu-
ment or failed to consider it because their holding clearly indicates a belief (a) that some
universal boilerplate formula exists for sixth amendment Miranda warnings, and (b) that
an adversarial party can effectively communicate it to an accused. This is evidenced by
the majority's reliance on Patterson's failure to articulate with precision any additional
information for the Miranda warnings which would more clearly advise an accused of the
benefits he is abandoning through waiver. Justice Stevens pointedly disagreed with this
belief when he stated that each criminal proceeding is different, and therefore, each set
of warnings given to an accused must be case-particular. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In addition, Justice Stevens noted that the requirements for waiver, as defined in
Supreme Court precedents, set a high threshold of sufficiency which cannot be over-
come by warnings offered by an opposing party, no matter how detailed the content. Id.




accused know of the "dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation."
167
Concentrating on the fact that some form of case-particular ad-
vice must be imparted to the accused prior to the execution of a
valid waiver, Justice Stevens continued on to argue that it would be
unethical for the prosecutor, or his or her agents, to provide such
advice. 168 Justice Stevens premised this argument on a number of
policy reasons. First, he agreed with the Second Circuit decision in
United States v. Mohabir 169 which, relying on the ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, 170 held that:
there are strong policy reasons, grounded in ethical considerations,
for not adopting the... alternative of having the prosecutor give fur-
ther warnings to the defendant. The government itself points out that
a prosecutor "is, in many senses an adversary of the defendant, and, as
such, is counseled not to give him legal advice."'
71
Second, Justice Stevens recognized that "the offering of legal advice
may lead an accused to underestimate the prosecuting authorities'
true adversary posture." 172 Third, he noted that the adversary posi-
tioning of the parties will make the prosecutor's advice tainted and
awry, regardless of the prosecutor's efforts to be unbiased, because
his job is to represent the state, not the accused. 173 Lastly, Justice
Stevens pointed out that the prosecutor's conflict of interest and the
resulting disadvantageous position of the defendant, portrays to the
public a "perception of unfairness and unethical conduct" within
the judicial system. 174 According to Justice Stevens, this portrayal
167 Id. at 2403 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 2403-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169 624 F.2d 1140 (1980).
170 Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A) provides:
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not: (1) Commu-
nicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a
party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior
consent of the lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so.
(2) Give advice to a person who is not represented by a lawyer, other than the
advice to secure counsel, if the interests of such person are or have a reasonable
possibility of being in conflict with the interests of his client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-104(A) (1980). See also United
States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 275 n.14 (1980)(similarly relying on DR 7-104(A)).
171 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2403-04 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Mohabir, 624
F.2d at 1152). See also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 316-17 (1985)(The Court rejected
defendant's waiver challenge, holding that police are not equipped to give advice in
place of defendant's counsel.).
172 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2404 (StevensJ, dissenting). According to justice Stevens,
this would be especially true in situations like that of Patterson, in which a minor is locked
in a jail for 48 hours and subsequently questioned by the police. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
173 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting). But seeJ. POLLOCK-BYRNE, ETICS IN CRIME &JUSTICE:
816 [Vol. 79
WAIVER OF COUNSEL
goes against the courts' interest of "ensuring that criminal trials are
conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that
legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them."1 75 The dis-
sent concluded that the policy reasons discussed above should pre-
vent the formation of a valid waiver when that waiver depends upon
the giving of legal advice by a prosecutor-an accused's
adversary. 1
76
In summary, Justice Stevens prefers the "easily identifiable"
rule of forcing law enforcement officials to refrain from interrogat-
ing an accused once adversary proceedings are initiated, unless they
either notify the accused's lawyer or receive authorization from the
court. 177 This, according to the dissent, is the clear mandate of the
sixth amendment right to counsel.'
78
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: DIFFERENCES IN THE UNDERLYING
POLICIES AND THE TIMES OF ATTACHMENT
The constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel is granted
by both the fifth' 79 and sixth amendments.' 80 However, the policies
that give rise to these guarantees and the times at which these rights
attach are separate and distinct.
The fifth amendment right to counsel was judicially created
under the holding of Miranda v. Arizona.' 8' The Miranda Court ex-
pressly was aware of the impact on the suspect's mind of the inter-
play between police interrogation and police custody-each
reinforcing the pressures and anxieties produced by the other.18 2 It
was this impact, the Court said, that makes "custodial police interro-
DILEMMAS & DEciSIONS (1989). Discussing the ethics of police using deception during
investigations and interrogations, the author stated that "[miany people see nothing
wrong-certainly nothing illegal-in using any methods necessary to catch criminals. Id.
at 93. The author concluded that "[ilt is unlikely that [deceptive] investigative tech-
niques will ever be eliminated; perhaps they should not be, since they are effective in
catching a number of people who should be punished. Even if one has doubtsabout the
ethics of these practices, it is entirely possible that there is no other way to accomplish
the task at hand." Id. at 95.
175 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2404 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 2405 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178 Id. at 2401 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179 "No person shall... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.. ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
180 See supra note 2 for the relevant text of the sixth amendment.
181 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
182 Id. at 445-58.
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gation" so devastating. 183 In order to counteract this impact and to
protect the suspect's right against compelled self-incrimination, the
Court adopted a number of prophylactic procedural requirements
to be applied during the "custodial interrogation" process. 8 4 One
of these procedural requirements, mandated by Miranda, was the
duty of the state to inform a suspect of his right to have counsel
present during "custodial interrogation."'18 5
In contrast to the "custodial" scope of the fifth amendment
right to counsel, the sixth amendment right was intially intended to
preserve the accused's privilege to secure representation of counsel at
trial.'86 This construction of sixth amendment attachment remained
until 1932, when the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama 187 estab-
lished the constitutional principle that the right to counsel attaches
in pre-trial proceedings. In Powell, the Court held that:
during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings ... that is
to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their
trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation
[are] vitally important, the defendants . . .[are] as much entitled to
such aid [of counsel] during that period as at the trial itself. l88
The Powell opinion strongly suggested that in all but the most ex-
ceptional cases, appointment of counsel is necessary to ensure a fair
trial.189 Powell's language emphatically stressed the inability of even
an "intelligent and educated layman" to properly represent himself,
and concluded that there was a need for "the guiding hand of coun-
sel at every step of the proceedings."' 190
In Spano v. New York, '9' in concurring opinions by justices Stew-
art and Douglas, the Powell rule was extended to include post-indict-
ment interrogation. ' 9 2 In cases following Spano, the Powell rule was
183 Id. at 457-58.
184 Id. at 479. "Custodial" interrogation is questioning which begins once the suspect
"has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." Id. at 444.
185 Id. at 473.
186 See supra note 2 for the relevant text of the sixth amendment.
187 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
188 Id. at 57.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 69.
19 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
192 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). In his concurring opinion, Justice Doug-
las affirmatively stated that a Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of coun-
sel at trial must provide no less to an indicted defendant who is being questioned by law
enforcement officials in a completely extrajudicial proceeding. Id. at 326 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). To provide less than this, he said, might deny a defendant "effective repre-
sentation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him." Id.
(Douglas, J. concurring).
In 1977, this extension reached majority status in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
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further expanded to provide counsel to an accused at "critical
stages" of the crimiial proceeding.'9 3 Finally, in 1972, Kirby v. Illi-
nois,194 concretely qualified the attachment of an accused's sixth
amendment right to counsel as being triggered at or after the initia-
tion of adversarial proceedings195 -which the Court defined as the
implementation of a "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indict-
ment, information, or arraignment."' 9 6
Thus, the fifth and sixth amendment rights to counsel differ in
the policies giving rise to each. The fifth amendment protects a sus-
pect from' compulsory self-incrimination. In contrast, the sixth
amendment protects an accused's privilege to deal with post-indict-
ment adversaries through counsel.
201 (1977), in which the Court held in a six to three decision that the sixth amendment
right to counsel attaches when the defendant is indicted; thereby prohibiting state ex-
traction of incriminating statements without the presence of counsel, absent a valid
waiver. Id. at 205-07. In Massiah, the defendant had been indicted and had retained a
lawyer prior to engaging in an incriminating conversation with an informant who was
bugged by the police. Id. at 202-03.
193 For instance an arraignment is a "critical stage" of the trial when the state fails to
provide the defendant with the assistance of counsel. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52,
55 (1961)(The prosecution challenged the defendant's late entry of an insanity plea as
being irretrievably lost, but the Supreme Court, ruling in favor of the defendant, con-
cluded that, whether defendant would have actually raised the insanity defense or not
"can never be known" because only counsel present at the time "could have enabled the
accused to know all the defenses available to him and to plead intelligently.").
See also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1977)(post-indictment questioning
is a "critical stage"); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)(post-indictment line-
up is a critical prosecutive stage at which accused is entitled to aid of counsel); Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967)(identification line-up is a "critical stage" because assist-
ance of counsel is necessary to preserve integrity of accused's right to trial); Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)(Court overreached Powell rule to include pre-indictment
contact between the state and suspect as a "critical stage"); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
59 (1963)(preliminary hearing is a "critical stage").
194 406 U.S. 682 (1972)(plurality opinion).
195 Id. at 689 (plurality opinion). The Kirby test, initially only resting on the result of a
plurality opinion, was strengthened eight years later, when it won majority support in
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
196 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689 (plurality opinion). In decisively answering the question of when
the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches, the Kirby Court emphasized the importance of
the formal charge:
The intiation ofjudicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is the
starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then
that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the ad-
verse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a de-
fendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and
immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law. It is this
point, therefore, that marks the commencment of the "criminal prosecutions" to
which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable. See
Powell, 287 U.S. at 66-71 ; Massiah, 377 U.S. [at 205]; Spano, 360 U.S. [at] 324
(Douglas, J. concurring)."
Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-690 (plurality opinion)(footnotes omitted).
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These rights to counsel also differ in when they attach during
the criminal process. During "custodial interrogation" fifth amend-
ment rights attach. 197 Conversely, during "every stage of the adver-
sarial proceedings" sixth amendment rights attach.' 98 These
differences in policy and attachment have been underscored in
Supreme Court cases prior to Patterson and in Patterson itself: "[O]ur
cases have recognized a difference between the Fifth Amendment
and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel," as well as a difference in
"the policies behind these Constitutional guarantees."'' 99
B. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: PRE-PATTERSON WAIVER REQUIREMENTS
AND PRECEDENTIAL MEASUREMENTS OF SIXTH AMENDMENT
VIOLATIONS
In considering assertions of waiver of the right to counsel, the
Supreme Court has provided clear procedural requirements for the
fifth amendment privilege. First, a waiver can exist only if the sus-
pect has been told of his Miranda right to counsel. 200 Second, if au-
thorities have given the Miranda warnings and if the suspect does
not invoke his fifth amendment right to counsel, then a waiver can
be valid during police-initiated custodial interrogation. 20 1 Lastly, if
the suspect does request the presence of an attorney,, then state offi-
cials are subsequently barred from interrogating him or her,202 un-
less the suspect intiates a meeting with the state at a later time. 203
197 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.
198 Powell, 287 U.S. at 66-71.
199 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2397 (citations omitted).
200 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Of course, a waiver of the fifth amend-
ment right to counsel must also be voluntary. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287
(1936)(use of confession in state court barred when suspect was brutally whipped and
tortured in order to obtain the statement). Prior to Miranda, the Supreme Court, under
the voluntariness test, undertook a continuing re-evaluation of the facts of each case.
The voluntariness test required "examination of all of the attendant circumstances" sur-
rounding each confession. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963). After Mi-
randa, the voluntariness test was no longer the single standard with which to judge
confessional validity, but rather a requirement which must be satisfied.
201 Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104-05 (1975).
202 In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the Supreme Court stated that the
scope of interrogation that is prohibited by invocation of the fifth amendment right to
counsel goes beyond mere questioning:
We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in cus-
tody is subjected either to express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is
to say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express question-
ing, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those nor-
mally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01 (emphasis added).
203 "[A]n accused ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through
counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been
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By comparison, the procedural requirements for waiver of the
sixth amendment right to counsel, prior to Patterson, have been far
less well defined. Nevertheless, the pre-Patterson Supreme Court
cases, which addressed the waiver question, established a trend of
strictly applying the broad, albeit unclear, procedural requirements.
Therefore, if a court was to err, it would err in favor of protecting
the accused's right to counsel. 2
0 4
The first test of a waiver, stated in the 1938 Supreme Court case
of Johnson v. Zerbst,205 was defined as being applicable to those fun-
damental constitutional rights which are intended to protect a fair
trial and the reliability of the truth-determining process.206 The
sixth amendment right to have counsel certainly falls within this
subset. The waiver standard, set by Johnson, was general in scope: a
valid waiver must be based on "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." 20 7 Regardless of its
generality, it is a strict standard that is evaluated (a) under "every
reasonable presumption against waiver,"'208 and (b) within the par-
ticular facts surrounding the assertion of waiver.20 9 Johnson, how-
ever, dealt only with a situation in which the accused was denied
representation of counsel at trial, and consequently, did not provide
much in the way of specifics for an assertion of waiver at the post-
indictment questioning stage.
Applying the Johnson test to an accused's choice to proceed pro
se at trial, against the warnings of the judge, the Court in Faretta v.
California210 held that a sixth amendment waiver of counsel at trial
will be invalid unless the judge communicates "the dangers and dis-
advantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish
that '[the accused] knows what he is doing and his choice is made
made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication." Ed-
wards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). Therefore, a two-step analysis must be
used. It must be determined (i) whether the defendant "initiated" the further conversa-
tion and, if so, (ii) whether he thereafter waived his right to counsel. Oregon v. Brad-
shaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1043-46 (1983).
204 See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986)("Doubts must be resolved in
favor of protecting the Constitutional claim."); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938)(Courts must "indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of funda-
mental constitutional rights.").
205 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
206 Id. at 464.
207 Id.
208 Id. See also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (Court expressly put the
burden of proof on the state in an assertion of sixth amendment waiver case).
209 Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.
210 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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with eyes open.' "211 This strengthenedJohnson standard, described
in Faretta, was buttressed further by Brewer v. Williams,212 which un-
equivocally established that the burden of persuasion rests heavily
on the state when trying to prove that an accused "knowingly and
intelligently" waived his sixth amendment right to have counsel
present at post-indictment interrogation. 213 Thus, prior to Patterson,
even though the procedural requirements for waiver at the post-in-
dictment stage were somewhat unclear in scope,2 14 they were strictly
applied on a case-by-case basis in order to fully protect the ac-
cused's rights during the adversarial process.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court parameters of what consti-
tuted a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel were very
broad, emphasizing, prior to Patterson, an air of extreme restrictive-
ness on the investigatory conduct of state officials during post-in-
dictment questioning. At the time Patterson reached the Supreme
Court, a sixth amendment violation was defined as being a "deliber-
ate elicitation," by the state, of an accused's inculpatory statement,
in the absence of an executed waiver.2 15
In Massiah v. United States,216 and the subsequent revival of that
case's holding in Brewer v. Williams,2 17 sixth amendment violations
were further described in such a way as to promote greater protec-
tions for the accused as well as to extend restrictions on the state's
conduct in interrogational settings. In Massiah, the Court found a
violation of the right to counsel when the police, with the aid of a
211 Id. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279
(1942)).
212 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
213 Id. at 403.
214 Prior to Patterson, the holding in Brewer encompassed the most recent requirement
for waiver. In Brewer, the Supreme Court decided the question of sixth amendment
waiver by focusing on the state's investigatory conduct. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404-05.
Brewer rejected a sixth amendment waiver, holding that the state's "deliberate elicita-
tion" of Williams' incriminating statements, in the absence of his counsel, violated his
sixth amendment rights; and therefore, waiver was deemed impossible. Id.
Yet, the Supreme Court's focus on "deliberate elicitation" failed to provide any
meaningful foundation for clear requirements to the waiver inquiry because the Court
never found waiver in a case involving "deliberate elicitation." Id. Thus, the composi-
tion of clear procedural requirements for sixth amendment waiver cases had been pri-
marily left to the circuit and state courts, which invented varied and contradictory
standards.
215 United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 270, 74 (1980). The Supreme Court defined
"deliberate elicitation" very broadly, holding that a sixth amendment violation occurs
any time a law enforcement official intentionally causes a situation that he should have
known was likely to induce incriminating statements by the accused without the assistance of
counsel. Id.
216 377 U.S. 201 (1984).
217 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
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cooperating and bugged codefendant, "deliberately elicited" un-
counseled incriminating statements from the accused in the ac-
cused's automobile.2 18  Likewise, in Williams, a confession-
provoking speech, orated by'a police officer while transporting the
accused to another county, was held to have violated the accused's
right to counsel because the detective "deliberately and designedly
set out to elicit information from Williams," after he had repeatedly
requested counsel's assistance.2 19 These cases have found viola-
tions of the accused's sixth amendment right to counsel when the
accused was neither in custody, nor being interrogated, nor was
even aware that the police were eliciting information from him.
C. PATTERSON'S DISREGARD FOR THE "PRESUMPTION AGAINST
WAIVER" PRECEDENT
These Supreme Court cases portray a willingness to find viola-
tions of the sixth amendment right to counsel beyond the post-in-
dictment interrogational setting of Patterson. Concomitantly, these
cases also evince a high threshold for the establishment of valid
waivers, in which the state bears a heavy burden of proof. Thus,
pre-Patterson decisions-in the spirit of Powell and its progeny-
stressed protection of the accused's right to counsel; and, conse-
quently, did not strive to rationalize an easing of the restraints on
state investigatory conduct. An example of this is the holding of
People v. Settles,220 which held:
[N]o knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel may be said to have
occurred without the essential presence of counsel. True, a defendant
would be appreciably less inclined to waive counsel when sufficiently
apprised of the effects of that waiver by an attorney.... That is not
the point. At the time when legal advice is most critically needed, [the
New York Constitution] strikes the balance in favor of the defendant
by placing a buffer, in the form of an attorney, between himself and
the coercive power of the State.
22 1
In contrast, the Court in Patterson disregarded the "strong pre-
sumption against waiver" trend 222 which emphasized the critical dif-
ferences in policy and attachment of the two constitutional
guarantees, and maintained a low threshold for sixth amendment
violations. 223 Instead, Patterson has promoted an easing of the re-
straints on state investigatory conduct at post-indictment
218 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 201-07.
219 Brewer, 430 U.S. at 387-414.
220 46 N.Y.2d 154, 385 N.E.2d 612, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1978).
221 Id. at 164, 385 N.E.2d at 617, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
222 Patterson v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 2389, 2402 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




D. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT FORMULA FOR WAIVER IN PATTERSON
VERSUS THE DISSENT'S PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT OF
NOTIFYING COUNSEL PRIOR TO INTERROGATION
In order to ensure protection of Patterson's sixth amendment
right to have counsel present at interrogation, the Court could have
established either of two principles. It could have adopted the fifth
amendment formula 225 or it could have instituted the dissent's pro-
cedural requirement of demanding that an accused's counsel be no-
tified prior to or be present at post-indictment interrogation.
226
Although the majority opted for the former standard, the latter of
these procedural formulas is more desirable for a number of
reasons.
It may be conceded that Miranda warnings do effectively inform
the accused that he has a right to counsel. However, it cannot be
convincingly argued that these warnings sufficiently apprise the ac-
cused of "the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation"
227
so that his waiver is "made with eyes open." 228 Justice White argues
the contrary, premising his argument on the unidimensionality of
counsel's role at interrogation-"largely limited to advising his cli-
ent as to what questions to answer and which ones to decline to
answer." 22
9
Justice Stevens appropriately characterized this argument as an
understatement of "what a lawyer can do for" the accused. 230 As
Justice Stevens pointed out, an attorney, by virtue of his or her pre-
sumably greater knowledge of available substantive and procedural
defenses, provides benefits necessary to ensure a fair trial. 231 As a
224 Id. at 2396-97.
225 See supra notes 200-203 and accompanying text.
226 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2400-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For the sake of compari-
son, this Note does not extensively discuss the state's other option of obtaining ajudicial
grant to interrogate the accused in the absence of counsel.
227 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
228 Adams v. United States ev rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942).
229 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2395 n.6, 2397-99.
230 Id. at 2403 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
231 Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting). See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66-71 (1932),
in which the Court held:
[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not compre-
hend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman
has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with a crime, he is
incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or
bad .... Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper
charge .... He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his de-
fense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
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consequence of waived representation, counsel would not be pres-
ent: (1) to "examine the indictment for legal sufficiency;" 23 2 (2) to
determine the prudence of cooperating or remaining silent by being
more able to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the evidence
against the accused, given the specified facts about the accused's
age, and the nature and circumstances of the offense; 233 (3) to deter-
mine whether plea-bargaining "negotiations may be most fruitful if
initiated prior to any interrogation;" 234 (4) to skillfully negotiate
such a plea-bargain; 23 5 and (5) "to explain to the accused the nature
of the charges pending against him."' 236 The words, "anything
[you] might say can be used against [you]," 237 simply do not make
the accused aware of the attorney benefits listed here,238 which are
part and parcel "of the 'dangers and disadvantages of self-represen-
tation' during questioning." 23
9
The majority circumvented the need to inform the accused of
the above listed advantages,240 by stating that such information is
unnecessary and not part of the constitutional minimum required
under Oregon v. Elstad.2 41 This is a questionable application of El-
stad. In Elstad, the defendant made two inculpatory statements to
police, the first of which was not preceded by an issuance of his Mi-
randa warnings.2 42 In an appeal to suppress his highly inculpatory
second statement, the defendant argued that he was unable to give a
fully informed waiver of his rights the second time around because
he was unaware that his initial, unwarned statement could not be
used against him.2 43 The Court based its rejection of this argument
step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Id. at 66-71 (emphasis added).
232 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2403 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
233 See Project, Interrogation in New Haven, The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519,
1604 (1967)[hereinafter Yale Interrogation Study].
234 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2403 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
238 See Wasserman, Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel: Standards for Knowing and Intelligent
Pretrial Waivers, 60 B.U.L. Rav. 738, 763 (1980)(The state's burden simply "is not met by
the mere showing that the accused was given Miranda warnings, with or without the
additional warning as to the existence of a pending indictment."). But see Comment,
Constitutional Law.-Right to Counsel, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 399, 409 (1981).
239 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2402-03. (Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting Faretta, 422 U.S.
at 835).
240 Id. at 2396.
241 470 U.S. 298 (1985). See supra note 107 for a discussion of Elstad's facts and
holding.




on the fact that "[t]he standard Miranda warnings explicitly in-
form[ed] the suspect of his right to consult a lawyer before speak-
ing."' 244 The Court reasoned that "[p]olice officers are ill-equipped
to pinch-hit for counsel, construing the murky and difficult ques-
tions of when 'custody' begins or whether a given unwarned state-
ment will ultimately be held inadmissible." 245
Elstad's reasoning indicates that the Supreme Court has granted
the defendant a right to counsel in Miranda so that "the murky and
difficult questions" 246 surrounding interrogation can be properly
addressed by a defending lawyer and not by the police. Conse-
quently, Elstad concludes that, because it is the lawyer's job to ex-
plain the legalities of a waiver to the accused, the state has no duty
to communicate "a full and complete appreciation of all of the con-
sequences flowing" 247 from a defendant's waiver. Thus, the very
case Patterson employs to support its argument is based on inappo-
site reasoning. Patterson used Elstad to prove that it is sufficient for
the state to inform the accused of only two waiver-consequences:
that his words may be used against him; and that he will dispose of
counsel's only beneficial function-keeping him from making incul-
patory statements. 248 In contrast, Elstad emphasized the importance
of the right to counsel, as well as the unique and necessary functions
counsel performs for the defendant. 249 In fact, Elstad's reasoning
supports Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion that counsel's presence
at post-indictment interrogation is needed to provide the accused
with necessary information and advice. 250
In addition to its faulty application of Elstad, the Patterson Court
also failed to take into account-during its "pragmatic ap-
proach" 25 1-the full practical merits of requiring accused's counsel
to be present at post-indictment questioning. Removing defending
counsel from certain post-indictment interrogations is disadvanta-
geous to the state because any benefits that would result from de-
fending counsel's presence are eclipsed. For instance, if the
accused's counsel is present at post-indictment questioning, the in-
herent ethical dangers arising from the interplay of a prosecutor and
244 Id. at 316.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2396 (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316-17).
248 Id. at 2396.
249 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316-17.
250 The majority failed to cite any other case in support of its conclusion, nor did the
majority give any textual explanation of its interpretation beyond citing the desired quo-
tation. Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2396.
251 Id. at 2397-99.
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the accused, underscored by Justice Stevens, 252  would be
eradicated.
The state would further benefit from defending counsel's role
as a witness of record at each interrogation. If communication is
undocumented and if there is a significant discrepancy between each
party's version of the relevant facts as to what was said or done dur-
ing interrogation, as was the case in Patterson,253 the defending
counsel's attendance would remove the necessity of a "judgment
call" by the trier of fact.254 Likewise, the defending attorney's pres-
ence would remove the question of whether the accused offered his
or her statement voluntarily;255 voluntariness being a necessary
prerequisite. 25
6
Furthermore, requiring the notification or presence of an ac-
cused's attorney during post-indictment questioning may also serve
to expedite the criminal process. When an accused erroneously as-
sesses his or her situation and concludes that remaining silent is the
best alternative, at least one study has shown that counsel, believing
otherwise, would urge an accused to cooperate in a number of
circumstances. 2
57
It might be argued by the majority that, regardless of these ad-
vantages, mandatory notification or attendance would hinder most
criminal cases. Presumably this argument would be based on the
importance of interrogation as a needed step toward achieving a
conviction, most likely resulting from admissions or confessions.
Although there is some merit to this contention, studies have shown
that the outcome of a case is generally not contingent on or deter-
mined by the fruits of interrogation. 258 Nevertheless, it is significant
252 Id. at 2399-2404 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra notes 140-178 and accompany-
ing text.
253 See supra notes 42 and 48, and accompanying text.
254 Cf Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470 (In a fifth amendment context, the Court held that
"[t]he presence of a lawyer can ... help guarantee that the accused gives a fully accurate
statement to the police and that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at
trial.") (citations omitted).
255 Cf Id. (Finding the state's investigatory conduct fifth amendment violative, the
Court held that "[wlith a lawyer present [at interrogation] the likelihood that the police
will practice coercion is reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can
testify to it in Court.").
256 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2394 n.4; See supra note 200.
257 See Yale Interrogation Study, supra note 220, at 1602-03.
258 Id. at 1588. The Yale Study indicates that:
[tiaking all assumptions and reservations into account, it appears that interroga-
tions may be even less necessary than our figures indicate. In almost every case...
the police had adequate evidence to convict the suspect without any interrogation.
Interrogation usually just cemented a cold case or served to identify accomplices.
This finding is probably explained by the fact that the police were unable to
arrest even a single person for crimes where no witnesses were available. Signifi-
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that the formula offered by the dissent does not erase the opportu-
nity for law enforcement officials to secure a confession, or similarly
incriminating statements, if the officials deem it necessary to prose-
cution. This elicitation can still take place during pre-indictment
stages or in the presence of counsel at post-indictment question-
ing.259 In contrast, the disadvantage of the majority's rule is that
protection of an accused's sixth amendment right to counsel-criti-
cally emphasized in Powell and its progeny-must take a backseat to
"law enforcement unfettered by process concerns." 26 0 This result is
entirely unnecessary if the dissent's position is forwarded. 26 1
In addition, Patterson dealt with prosecutorial interrogation, oc-
curring after indictment. Because the filing of an indictment "pre-
sumably signals the government's conclusion that it has sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case," 26 2 then "authorities are no
longer trying 'to solve a crime.'"263 Therefore, the need to elicit
cantly, the evidence obtained by the President's Commission indicates that this is
true of other cities as well.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
259 In addition, interrogation is only one of the vehicles open to the police in order to
elicit necessary information. "Several comparative studies of clearance rates imply that
investigative alternatives to interrogation are not only available but are successfully re-
sorted to by law enforcement agencies when judicial rulings restrict or inhibit the use of
interrogations and confessions." Id. at 1580 n.161.
260 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2402 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
261 It might be argued that the dissent's formula would provide an incentive for law
enforcement officials to delay the filing of formal charges in order to maintain the op-
portunity to interrogate the defendant in the absence of counsel. This would be a clear
disadvantage of the dissent's formula were it not for the existence of statutes of limita-
tions which often define clear timetables within which the suspect must be charged. Fur-
thermore, when these timetables are abused, the holding of United States v. Marion, 404
U.S. 307 (1972), is clearly applicable:
[T]he Government concedes that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
would require dismissal of the indictment if it were shown at trial that the pre-in-
dictment delay in this case caused substantial prejudice to [defendant]'s rights to a
fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over
the accused. Cf Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.
264 (1959).
Marion, 404 U.S. at 324.
262 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2402 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
263 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1148
(2d Cir. 1980)). But see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respon-
dent at 20 n.9, Patterson v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988)(No. 86-7059), which states
that the suggestion
that the government's interest in obtaining such evidence is reduced because any
questioning of the defendant by the government can only be for the purpose of
buttressing a prima facie case . . . rests upon an unrealistic view of the criminal
justice process. While in -some instances the government's case is complete at the
time of indictment, there are many instances in which charges must be brought after
probable cause is established but before the investigation is complete. Even when
the prosecution believes that it has sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction, the
vagaries of the jury system are such that the prospect of a conviction does not ap-
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incriminating evidence or a confession, "to buttress the govern-
ment's case" after indictment, is suspect as an erroneous reason to
remove the presence of an accused's counsel at post-indictment
questioning.
264
Moreover, as Justice Stevens points out in his dissenting opin-
ion, there are policy reasons of "unequaled strength" which man-
date that an accused's attorney should be either notified or present
during post-indictment prosecutorial interrogation;265 not the least
of which is the fundamentally altered relationship between the state
and the defendant once formal charges have been filed.
Coupled with Justice Stevens' policy concerns, is Justice Black-
mun's view that "the Sixth Amendment does not allow the prosecu-
tion to take undue advantage of any gap between the
commencement of the adversary process and the time at which
counsel is appointed for a defendant. ' 266 This concern of Justice
Blackmun extends beyond the mere disadvantage suffered by Pat-
terson in this case. Forcing the state to prove itself in an arena
which is defined by adversarial forces, is at the base of our judicial
system's truth-determining process. The purpose of the sixth
amendment is to assure that in any "criminal prosecutio[n]," 267 the
accused shall not be left to his own devices in facing the
" 'prosecutorial forces of organized society.' "268 By its very terms,
it becomes applicable only when the government's role shifts from
investigation to accusation. For it is only then that the assistance of
one versed in the "intricacies of... law," 269 is needed to assure that
proach certainty until the government's evidence crosses the line between a strong
case and an overwhelming one. For that reason, the investigative process often
continues after the commencement of adversary proceedings as the prosecution
seeks to present the strongest possible case at trial.
Id. at 20.
264 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2402 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Jurek v. Estelle, 623
F.2d 929, 939-40 (5th Cir. 1980)(defendant's voluntary first confession properly admit-
ted at trial, but defendant's second confession improperly admitted because involuntary
and induced by "prosecutorial drive for death penalty" after crime had been solved).
Furthermore, the probability of eliciting a confession after an indictment has been filed
is minimal. In 1963, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, Dean Ach-
eson, affirmatively testified as to the unlikely success of eliciting a confession in the post-
indictment stage. According to Acheson, a high percentage of confessions occur within
three hours after arrest, if they are to occur at all. Hearings on H.R. 7525 and S. 486 Before
the Senate Commission on the District of Columbia, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 443 (1963).
265 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2404 (Stevens, J., dissenting); See supra notes 140-178 and
accompanying text.
266 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2399 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
267 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.





the prosecution's case encounters "the crucible of meaningful adversarial
testing."
270
The strength of the dissenting opinions, in conjunction with the
rationale proffered in this Note, lead to the conclusion that Patter-
son did not "knowingly and intelligently" waive his sixth amend-
ment right to have counsel present at post-indictment questioning,
regardless of the majority's attempt to narrowly carve out an excep-
tion to the "presumption against waiver" previously established by
the Court.271 In summary, the rationale of the majority's holding in
Patterson v. Illinois is erroneous because it fails to follow the underly-
ing principles of precedent, and runs counter to the substantive,
procedural, ethical and policy concerns of our adversary system.
E. THE EFFECTS OF PATTERSON ON SIXTH AMENDMENT WAIVERS
WHERE THE DEFENDANT IS NOT TOLD OF HIS INDICTMENT
In reaching its decision, the Patterson Court expressly declined
to rule on the issue of "whether or not an accused must be told that
he has been indicted before a postindictment Sixth Amendment
waiver will be valid." 27 2 This Note, although recognizing that the
reasoning in Patterson may lead a subsequent Court to answer this
question negatively, concludes that, if an accused must be made
aware of the consequences he or she faces by waiving his or her
right to counsel, then informing the accused of the indictment is
necessary.
The majority maintains that Miranda warnings apprise the ac-
cused of the "ultimate adverse consequence"-that anything he or
she might say can be used against him or her at trial. 273 This is not
enough, however, to make the accused sufficiently aware of the
"dangers and disadvantages of self-representation" 27 4 so that the
accused's waiver will be "made with eyes open." 2 75 One inadequacy
of the Miranda warnings is that they do not inform an accused that
criminal litigation is impending. This omission might cause the ac-
cused to underestimate the strength of the government's case
against him or her and, concomitantly, the prudence of requesting
counsel's aid. Even though the accused may be aware of the ulti-
mate adverse consequence of his or her waiver, by virtue of the Mi-
270 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984)(emphasis added).
271 The Court's holding was narrowly limited to post-indictees, in an interrogational
setting, who have been informed of their charge. Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2397 n.8.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 2395-96..
274 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
275 Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942).
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randa warnings, the accused's eyes are not open to the fact that this
ultimate adverse consequence is forthcoming-a fact that would be
communicated by informing him or her of the indictment.
In evaluating the benefits or necessity of counsel at the interro-
gational stage, or at any post-indictment stage, an accused certainly
needs to be aware that the government has secured enough evi-
dence to establish a prima facie case 276 and that the "prosecutorial
forces of organized society" 277 have been mobilized against him or
her. Therefore, only by additionally informing the accused that for-
mal charges have been filed, and consequently, that the "the gov-
ernment has committed itself to prosecute," 278 can the accused
properly assess the benefits of counsel "with eyes open." 279
A decision which had made "knowledge of indictment" a proce-
dural requirement for a valid sixth amendment waiver would have
been more consistent with the holdings of Powell and its progeny
which have critically emphasized the filing of formal charges as a
major alteration in the relationship between the defendant and the
state in the criminal process. 280 Likewise, such a decision would be
in keeping with the reasoning of lower courts that have upheld the
efficacy of the fifth amendment formula. 28 1 Those courts, like the
Illinois Supreme Court in Patterson,282 interpreted the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel as requiring that the accused, in addition to
the Miranda warnings, must be made aware "of the gravity of his
situation" before a valid waiver can be properly executed. 283 Ac-
cording to these courts, one is aware of the gravity of the situation
when one has been told of his or her indictment.28
4
Moreover, the execution of this added procedural requirement
would not be cumbersome upon law enforcement officials, who
276 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2402.
277 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
278 Id.
279 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
280 See supra notes 174-183 and accompanying text for examples of holdings of Powell
and its progeny.
281 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2396 n.8 ("IT]hose lower court cases which have suggested
that something beyond Miranda warnings is-or may be-required before a Sixth
Amendment waiver can be considered "knowing and intelligent" have... occasional[ly]
suggest[ed] that, in addition ...an accused should be informed that he has been
indicted.").
282 People v. Thomas, 116 Ill. 2d 290, 507 N.E.2d 843 (1987), aff'd sub nom. Patterson
v. Illinois, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988).
283 Thomas, 116 Ill. 2d at 299-300, 507 N.E.2d at 846-47.
284 See, e.g., United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1150 (2d Cir. 1980); United
States v. Payton, 615 F.2d 922, 924-25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 969 (1980); People




would merely have to precede the warnings they must normally ad-
minister with a statement concerning the accused's indictment. 28 5
In Patterson's case, Officer Gresham disposed of this requirement
by simply informing Patterson "that a Grand Jury indictment had
just been handed down" 286 and that he had been charged with the
offense of "murder and armed violence."
28 7
Furthermore, the lesson in Wheat v. United States288 is particu-
larly applicable to this issue. In Wheat, the Supreme Court held that
the "courts have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal
trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession
and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them."
28 9
Witholding pertinent information from an accused about his or her
status-in effect keeping the accused guessing about information
that could be easily conveyed-and calling upon him or her to make
critical decisions without the benefit of this knowledge will certainly
be viewed by the public as unfair. One can imagine the effect on a
jury that would result from the following examination at trial: Ques-
tion: "Why didn't you tell the defendant that he had been indicted
and was now facing the mobilized prosecutorial forces of the state
so that he could properly evaluate the benefits of counsel given all
the relevant facts?" Answer: "Because he didn't ask me."
The danger of Patterson is that a strict and myopic application of
the majority's reasoning might obviate the need for such indict-
ment-knowledge. In Patterson, the majority reasoned that the virtual
identity between a post-indictment defendant who fails to exercise
his or her sixth amendment right to counsel, and a preindictee who
has also declined to request representation, as well as the similarity
285 But see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (White, J., dissenting) which stated that:
[t]here is absolutely no reason to require an additional question to the already cumber-
some Miranda litany just because the majority finds another case-Massiah v. United
States-providing exactly the same right to counsel as that involved in Miranda....
If an intentional relinquishment of the right to counsel under Miranda is established
by proof that the accused was informed of his right and then voluntarily answered
questions in counsel's absence, then similar proof establishes an intentional relin-
quishment of the Massiah right to counsel.
Id. at 436 n.5 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). It is significant to note, however,
that the Court in Brewer did not specifically address the question at issue here because
the defendant had already been arrested, arraigned, committed to jail and was free on
bail when the state's investigatory conduct was challenged as sixth amendment violative.
Id. at 391.
286 Joint Appendix at 6, People v. Thomas, 116 Ill. 2d 290, 507 N.E.2d 843
(1980)(Nos. 63144, 63149).
287 Id.
288 108 S. Ct. 1692 (1988).
289 Id. at 1697. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279




of a lawyer's function in the two contexts, supports the conclusion
that the fifth amendment formula should suffice to establish a know-
ing and intelligent waiver of the two rights.290 In doing so, the Pat-
terson majority distanced itself from the precedents which
underscored the important differences between the fifth and sixth
amendment rights to counsel. Further, even though the Court was
not addressing the issue of whether indictment-knowledge is neces-
sary, it did hold that there is little else, if anything, which could be
added to the Miranda warnings in order to more clearly apprise the
accused of the consequences of his or her waiver.
29 1
In light of these identities, drawn by the majority from the fifth
and sixth amendment settings, and the Court's unwillingness to
augment the Miranda warnings, it is conceivable that the Court
would refuse to make a partial retreat from this reasoning and hold,
in a later case, that an accused does not have to be additionally in-
formed that formal charges have been filed against him or her.
V. CONCLUSION
In Patterson v. Illinois, the Supreme Court significantly withdrew
from prior cases which have emphasized the need to protect an ac-
cused's right to counsel at every stage of the adversary proceeding.
The Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel is not
violated by the occurrence of uncounseled, state-initiated, post-in-
dictment interrogation, provided that it is preceded by a "knowing
and intelligent" waiver by the accused.29 2 According to the Court, a
valid waiver in this context is evidenced by proper state administra-
tion of the accused's Miranda warnings.
The Court's holding is erroneous because it is premised on two
individually faulty equations formulated by the majority: an analogy
between counsel's function at pre-indictment questioning and coun-
sel's function at post-indictment interrogation; and, an analogy be-
tween Patterson-a post-indictment accused-and a pre-indictment
suspect. These equivalencies, established by the majority, are erro-
neous for a number of reasons, not the least of which are the sub-
stantive, procedural, and policy-oriented differences which divide
the fifth and sixth amendment stages of the criminal process.
The effect of the Supreme Court's holding in Patterson v. Illinois
is disturbing. The Court's determination to find a waiver, and its
application of the fifth amendment formula for waiver to a sixth
290 Patterson, 108 S. Ct. at 2389-99.
291 Id. at 2395-96.
292 Id. at 2396-97.
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amendment context, will have the unfortunate effect of increasing
the chance that a post-indictee's right to counsel will be compro-
mised at other critical stages of the adversary process. The only
comforting factor-if it can be called that-is the narrow application
of this holding, which restricts the scope of Patterson to situations in
which the accused is in a post-indictment, interrogational setting,
and has been told of his or her indictment.
JOHN S. BANAS, III
